HARTSHORNE AND THE
METAPHYSICS OF ANIMAL RIGHTS
Judith Barad
Indiana State University

P

rofessor Daniel Dombrowski's book is
the first in the ever-growing field of
animal rights literature to specifically
address the metaphysical basis for the
rights of nonhuman animals. Its importance as a
seminal work should not be underestimated.
Successfully making Hartshorne's metaphysics
accessible to the general reader, Dombrowski also
uses what Hartshorne says about God and animals
to coherently defend philosophic vegetarianism. By
grounding animal rights firmly in a metaphysical
foundation, Dombrowski gives it a much needed
legitimization, obviating the frequently repeated
charges that moral rights are arbitrary and fictitious. His clearly written study addresses integral
metaphysical questions regarding the position of
animals in the overall structure of the universe and
the relationship between and the nature of both
God and creatures. Dombrowski lucidly and forcefully explains that whether an account of God's
nature is one of loving concern or vengeful wrath
or uncaring indifference, whether God is conceived as completely separate from the world or
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between rocks, trees and oxen whereas Aquinas
clearly insists on such a distinction. Happily,
though, Dombrowski's refutation of current theologians defending their position on man's dominance over animals is judiciously expounded.
Dombrowski's account of the Eastern religions'
views on animals is very absorbing, exhibiting considerable erudition. He points out that unlike
Hinduism, which only specifies duties about
animals, Jainism and Buddhism acknowledge duties
to animals. Generally, the merit of most Eastern religions is that they encourage "us to see human
affinity to nature." Dombrowski thinks that by combining the insights of St. Francis with those of
Eastern thought we will approach Hartshorne's
understanding of the place of animals in creation
and have a better understanding of God. The
overall virtue of the chapter is that it demonstrates
with unusual sensitivity how the relationship
between God and creatures issues in different practical effects depending on one's conception of this
relationship.
The flow from the first chapter to the second is
accomplished by presenting Hartshorne as a great
synthesizer between "the best insights of Western
theism and Eastern pantheism." He contrasts the
classical theistic tenets that God is one but not
many, being but not becoming, permanent but not
changing with Hartshorne's "panentheism," which
holds that both kinds of attributes are included in
the divine nature. Dombrowski argues that
Hartshorne's conception of God removes the
logical difficulties en tailed by classical theism's
insistence that God loves the world and is involved
in it yet is separate from it and unaffected by it.
Convincingly, he claims that "Hartshorne's theory
of God avoids the vast chasm between Creator and
creatures in classical theism while maintaining the
traditional Western belief in a personal God who is
that than which no greater can be conceived" (p.
39). The most important implication in this
chapter for the treatment of animals is that in
order to emulate a God who acts as a persuader
instead of a tyrant towards His creation, human
beings would have to adopt a benevolent rather
than a coercive attitude toward animals.
Having established a case for an intimate relationship between God and creatures, in his third
chapter Dombrowski argues that once we recognize

operating, in part, within it are issues that will have
a direct bearing on the treatment that is owed to
animals. I will review his remarkable feat on a
chapter by chapter basis.
Displaying an impressive grasp of the subject
matter in his first chapter, Dombrowski contrasts
Hartshorne's theories of God and animals with
those of the world's great religions. He persuasively
argues that God, as depicted in the Old Testament,
is either indifferent to or favors the exploitation of
animals. However, despite the chapter's many
salient qualities, it is the section of the book I had
the most quarrel with, since its persuasiveness is in
part due to an unbalanced presentation of some of
the theologies under consideration. In order to
show the preferability of Hartshorne's position on
God and animals, Dombrowski overemphasizes
Christianity's negative doctrines about animals with
little mention of its positive doctrines. Although
this is an excellent heuristic device, it leaves the
uninformed with an uneven picture. For example,
discussing the Old Testament, Dombrowski does
not mention man's relationship with animals
before his fall, when man was directed by God to be
a vegetarian. Yet even in a brief history of how the
world's religions view animals, this passage has
implications that should not be overlooked.
Dombrowski does mention Andrew Linzey's observation that after the fall meat eating is "permitted
only as a concession to human sinfulness," but dismisses it after an all too brief consideration.
Turning to "the intellectual framework that supports the dominant Christian view of animals,"
Dombrowski argues that Aquinas, the best representative of this view, provides "a metaphysical
support for the theological belief in human
dominion, namely, the control human beings have
over their actions, a control that animals lack."
Dombrowski offers a series of trenchant arguments
against Aquinas' claim. Yet he neglects mentioning
that a significant amount of Aquinas' metaphysics
would, if taken to its logical conclusion, lead to a
more respectful account of the treatment of
animals than that which is traditionally ascribed to
him. Due to his perception of Aquinas,
Dombrowski urges us to adopt the Franciscan pole
of Catholic thought rather than the Thomistic pole.
I am not convinced by his argument, since St.
Francis does not draw an ontological distinction
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our commonality with animals, we open the way for
their "fair treatment" (p. 46). One of the most
tired questions any animal rights advocate concon
fronts is, "Well, don't plants feel? How can one
non-arbitrarily draw the line of moral concern at
animals rather than plants?" Hartshorne's metameta
physics can address this question by taking into
account the findings of the empirical sciences,
findings which are relevant to any argument
seeking to base rights upon a being's ontological
status. Drawing on theories from contemporary
physics, Dombrowski explains that cells are sensen
tient individuals, showing signs of sensitivity to the
environment. Plants, like rocks, are multicellular
organisms and so are sentient in their parts. But as
a whole individual, a plant is not sentient, since it
lacks a nervous system. It is the nervous system,
composed of the only cells that endure throughout
an individual's lifetime, that allows for the interinter
action between an animal's societies of cells. This
interaction issues in a physiologically and psychopsycho
logically "supercellular individual," an individual
per se, not just in each of its parts. In sum, the
nervous system accounts for the difference
between a plant, where only the cells are sentient
individuals (Sl) and an animal, where the entire
being is a sentient individual as well as its cells
(S2). Although the lower form of sentieney found
in plants and rocks supports the environmentalist's
contention that the whole world is permeated with
value, it is the higher grade sentieney of S2 that we
have in common with other animals. Thus, unlike
plants, animals fall within our moral concern
"because they suffer, not simply because their cells
suffer" (p. 43). In my view, Hartshorne's distinction
between Sl and S2 is as crucial as his account of
God for providing a metaphysical basis for the fair
treatment of animals.
Our commonality with other animals leads
Dombrowski to ask, "If we, as subjects, value our
experiences and hence are of value, why not the
same to a lesser degree with other subjects with
their own implicate order?" For Dombrowski, each
individual that experiences its own existence has
intrinsic value. Differing from Regan, he concludes
the chapter by defending the idea of degrees of
inherent value without yielding to the notion that
beings of a higher value should exploit those of a
lower value, unless in extreme circumstances.

Betwet!ft the Species

Continuing this theme in the next chapter, one
that many animal rights advocates may find the
most controversial, Dombrowski argues that
human commonality with animals is compatible
with a doctrine of hierarchy of value. He claims
that "A three-year-old is already beyond the mental
level of one of the great apes." The superiority of
human beings over animals is due to the fact that
we enjoy the conscious understanding of our
finitude as well as possessing other abstract abilabil
ities. It may be objected that not all members of
the human species have these abstract abilities, but
Hartshorne, in a statement reminiscent of Darwin,
insists that human superiority over nonhuman
animals is not absolute but "largely a matter of
degree." Agreeing with Hartshorne, Dombrowski
notes the importance of a system of abstract
symbols, for without it freedom is narrowly curcur
tailed. For instance, only a human being can
choose to become a vegetarian or ignore arguargu
ments for vegetarianism. Although the human
being is the most free of animals, Dombrowski
points out that she is also the most dangerous for
her freedom permits her to act on the basis of selfself
interest rather than ethical concern for others.
The freedom to act on the basis of self-interest
leads to Dombrowski's observation that only
human beings can make metaphysical mistakes.
Interestingly, he notes that animals may, in a way,
be closer to metaphysical truth than humans somesome
times are, since whereas humans frequently live in
"their own world," animals, feeling God through
His influence on them, "play their parts well" in
relation to Him. Yet humans have the ability to
advance beyond this feeling to worship, defined as
"consciously" being aware of oneself as an indiindi
vidual who is nonetheless a fragment of the whole
of things" (p. 67). In a statement that should help
to dispel any suspicion on the reader's part of
speciesism, Dombrowski adds "those who live
without worship are more like the nonhuman
animals than those who live with it." One impliimpli
cation that can be drawn from such passages is that
human beings are continuous with other animal
species not only in marginal cases but also in
ordinary cases when people fail to employ symbolic
power. Thus the only quarrel I have with this
chapter's conclusion, "that the development of a
theory of human commonality with animals is not
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unnecessarily in laboratories or for the table. I
suspect that Dombrowski does not completely agree
with Hartshorne on this point, although the disdis
agreement is propitiated.
However, Dombrowski acknowledges that he is
"using Hartshorne to defend philosophic vegetarivegetari
anism rather than trying to understand
Hartshorne" (p. 3). Attempting to "narrow the gap"
between the two positions, he refers to
Hartshorne's view "that there is a new level of expeexpe
rience in animals not found in plants" to argue that
Hartshorne would agree "that it is only permissible
to eat animals if they are treated in a fair way while
alive" and are killed without pain. Given modern
unlike
demands for meat and, consequently, the unlikelihood that factory farms will disappear,
Dombrowski insists that if we do not want to be
involved in pain and suffering, it is a "practical
imperative to become a vegetarian." Thus
Dombrowski claims that although Hartshorne does
ofvegetar
not make any defmite statement in favor ofvegetarianism, it is the logical outcome of his position.
Drawing on his earlier discussion regarding the
individuality of animals and their corresponding
value, Dombrowski insists that human concern with
species of animals rather than with individuals is
rec
both irrational and based on self-interest. He reconciles his concern for animals as individuals with
the more environmental concern of Hartshorne by
means of several cogent arguments. For instance,
he agrees that the "greatest evil we do to animals is
to destroy their habitat, because to kill a whole
species is to kill massive numbers of individual
animals." And he levels Hartshorne's priority for
wilderness and wildlife to his more individualistic
concerns by noting that our willingness to treat
domesticated animals as "increments of capital on
under
modern factory farms" makes it difficult to understand "how we will show any more concern for
animals in the wild" unless this concern is based on
indi
self-interest. Further, combining concern for individual animals and the environment, Dombrowski
unnec
maintains that we must give up some of our unnecessary material possessions in order to spare both
individual animals, human and nonhuman, and the
environment on which all depend.
Chapters six and seven deal with Hartshorne's
predecessors, Plato and Wordsworth, who,
according to Dombrowski, both have views approxi-

necessarily the thesis that human beings transcend
animals in some important ways," is that the word
'some' should be inserted before 'human beings.'
If the fourth chapter may be judged the most
controversial, the fifth chapter may be the most
appreciated for the excellent quality of its arguargu
ments that animals deserve respectful treatment.
Dombrowski reasons that the human use of
symbols, the same function that sets us apart from
the rest of creation, enables us to be ethical beings.
Only humans can ask themselves "Whose values
ought to give way in the case of conflict?" An often
voiced criticism of the animal rights position is that
it either prefers animals to humans or detracts from
human welfare by recognizing the rights of animals.
Offering a powerful, convincing and original
argument, Dombrowski responds that ethical
concern is not "a pie of a fixed size," so that "giving
a slice to animals would deny something to a
deserving human being." Ethical concern is
unlimited. By refusing to eat animals or kill them
for clothing, etc., it is not the case that we are
giving animals something reserved for us, but
rather "not giving them the bludgeon or the knife
of the abattoir. "
The same symbolic power that accoun ts for
human transcendence over animals enables us to
see ourselves as "trustees for a cosmic end." But if
our trusteeship calls upon us to love all forms of
life, how can we justifY the fact that in order to exist
we must treat some other creatures as less
important than ourselves? Hartshorne's answer is
"weakens, as one
that value is a matter of degree; it "weakens.
goes 'down' the evolutionary scale from mammals
or birds, to fish, to other sea creatures." Hartshorne
and Dombrowski share Singer's advocacy of this
position, which naturally issues from basing ethics
on the metaphysical implications of evolutionary
theory.
Hartshorne discusses his degree of values theory
sub
in aesthetic terms, claiming that "ethics is subservient to aesthetics." This suggests a tension
between his views and those of Dombrowski, for, in
my estimation, Hartshorne's aesthetic view seems
more compatible with that of an environmentalist
than with that of an animal rights advocate. Indeed,
Hartshorne's "rough ordering of values" places
wildlife management and animals living in the
wilderness above concerns for killing animals
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mating panen theism. The fascinating study of
these thinkers explains how panentheism enables
us to take animal feelings seriously as elements in
God's life and how a consideration of an animal
body helps us understand God's nature. In the
second chapter, Hartshorne was shown to conceive
of God as involved in and affected by the pain and
suffering of beings in the world. Since the only
beings in the world that experience pain and sufsuf
fering as whole individuals are animals (both
human and nonhuman) the harms inflicted upon
them must be understood as being also inflicted
upon God. Plato's Timaeus clarifies this interaction
between the divine and non-divine natures. In this
work. "the World Soul represents a society of which
the Demiurge is the one preeminent member, "just
as the bodily cells of animals form a society "of
which the mental part is preeminent" Since "every
individual becomes, as it were, a brain cell directly
communicating to the World Soul," every indiindi
vidual influences it and is influenced by it Based
on his vivid explication of the World Soul,
Dombrowski establishes a historical precedent for
his claim that the "ultimate structure of experience
is social" and that love is ultimately grounded in
God. These chapters show how the deepest insights
of poetry and metaphysics merge into one propro
found truth.
Combining his previously expressed view that
the "basic principle human beings must use when
trying to understand others is to analogize with
what we know ourselves to be" (p. 51) with
Hartshorne's emphasis on aesthetics, Dombrowski,
in chapter eight, turns to an aesthetic analogy to
achieve an understanding of animals. This analogy
allows us to penetrate more deeply the "God is
love" doctrine, since, in a passage reminiscent of
Augustine, Dombrowski argues that variety "is an
aesthetic good, and not only for human beings, but
for God and animals as well." The particular sort of
aesthetic feeling Hartshorne has investigated is
bird song. The variety of bird song makes it worth
studying in itself, for what it can tell us about our
own nature, and for what it can tell us about the
Divine nature.
Dombrowski has succeeded in showing that
Hartshorne's conception of God is compatible with
a belief in a God of love. But in what specific ways
would a God of love require us to respond to the
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suffering of animals? Dombrowski concludes the
book by arguing that "a necessary, although not
sufficient, condition for any fair treatment of
animals" is vegetarianism (p. 133), a conclusion
warranted by his previous arguments that animals
are individuals having their own value, rather than
merely instrumental value. But in our contemcontem
porary culture, in which meat eating is commoncommon
place, Dombrowski considers our duty to be
vegetarian as an act of nonsupererogatory saintsaint
liness.
My summary cannot do justice to Dombrowski's
exceptionally clear and profound treatment of
many very complex themes in Hartshorne's metameta
physics, in animal rights, and in the relation
between them. He is exceedingly well-versed in the
areas of metaphysics, comparative religion, ethics,
quantum mechanics, and evolutionary theory, as
well as the whole of process philosophy. Some
animal rights advocates may be dissatisfied by
Dombrowski's defense of the ways in which human
beings transcend animality, and some process
philosophers may believe that he has pushed
Hartshorne too far with his attempt to use process
thought to provide a basis for philosophic vegetarivegetari
anism. However, members of both schools of
thought can benefit from a serious perusal of
Dombrowski's book. His illuminating study will be
a standard for everyone concerned with the relarela
tionship between metaphysics and anim~l rights for
many years to come.
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